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Abstract: Through specific, historical, interchanges and the more diffuse molding of 
our ‘Western’ social imaginary, the Judaic-Christian tradition has helped shape several 
of the criminal law’s culpability concepts, including guilt, blame and reconciliation. In 
doing so, it has contributed towards the inherent moral grammar of our criminal justice 
thinking. By considering perennial questions, such as the importance of consciousness 
and intentionality in determining culpability, and the importance of culpability within 
the architecture of criminal liability more broadly, this article argues that re-engaging 
with the religious underpinnings of these debates is important and worthwhile, 
particularly in an age marked by the desire to secularize the criminal law and to become 
‘emancipated’ from religious thinking. It concludes by suggesting that this re-
engagement yields important insights regarding the tensions that permeate our criminal 
justice practices and points towards ways in which these might potentially be 
reconciled. 
 

























                                                        
1 I have borrowed this term from Chris Tomlins’ 'Debt, Death, and Redemption: Toward a Soterial-Legal 
History of the Turner Rebellion' in D Cowan and D Wincott (eds) Exploring the ‘Legal’ in Socio-Legal 
Studies (Palgrave 2016).  
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Many of the terms we associate with criminal culpability – guilt, wrongdoing, blame, 
and punishment – are ‘metalegal concepts’. That is, they carry legal implications but, 
as products of the human condition more generally, draw their essence and meaning 
from beyond the legal sphere. 3  Perhaps the most obvious extra-legal source of 
‘Western’4 culpability concepts is the Judaic-Christian tradition. Various studies have 
shown how religious beliefs, actors, institutions and practices have shaped the criminal 
law, 5  especially the ideas and practices relating to punishment. 6  The influence of 
Christianity, particularly medieval Canon Law, is well documented7 and although there 
are fewer established links with Judaism, 8  Christianity arose out of Judaism and 
worked, in different ways, with a shared set of sources.9 Furthermore, at a more diffuse 
level, both traditions have contributed to the intellectual climate, or social imaginary, 
in which our legal thinking has developed.10  
 Despite this well-established religious heritage, criminal law theorists have 
generally shown limited interest in contemplating the theological roots of culpability 
and considering their ongoing salience. This disinclination reflects a more general 
reluctance to engage with morally charged terms, such as justice and guilt, that extends 
beyond criminal law theory and into criminology.11 Part of the explanation for such 
reticence is the perception that evaluative and homiletic matters of this sort exceed the 
proper intellectual remit of legal scholars. As one writer puts it, ‘[t]he subject is, 
frankly, too deep for a theorist of criminal law’.12 A further, related, explanation is the 
                                                        
3 Rafael Domingo God and the Secular Legal System (CUP 2016). 
4 I.e. typical of Anglo-American and European legal systems. 
5 E.g. Harold Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Harvard 
University Press 1983) and Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the 
Western Legal Tradition (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2003); Harold Maihold, ‘God’s 
Wrath and Charity: Criminal Law in (Counter-)Reforming Discourse of Redemption and Retribution’ in 
Wim Decock et al, Law and Religion: The Legal Teachings of the Protestant and Catholic Reformations 
(VAndenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co 2014); ‘Guilt (Schuld)’ in Stanley N Katz, Oxford International 
Encyclopedia of Legal History (OUP 2009); James Q Whitman, The Origins of Reasonable Doubt: 
Theological Roots of the Criminal Trial (Yale University Press 2008). 
6 E.g. Jeffrey C Tuomala, ‘Christ’s Atonement as a Model for Civil Justice’ (1993) American Journal of 
Jurisprudence 38 221; Jerome Hall, ‘Biblical Atonement and Modern Criminal Law’ (1983) Journal of 
Law and Religion 1(2) 279; Michael Ignatieff, ‘State, Civil Society, and Total Institutions: A Critique of 
Recent Social Histories of Punishment’ (1981) Crime and Justice 3 153; Michel Foucault, Discipline 
and Punish (Allen Lane, 1977); David A Green ‘Penal Optimism and Second Chances: The Legacies of 
American Protestantism and the Prospects for Penal Reform’ (2013) 15 Punishment & Society 123. 
7 Heikki Pihlajamäka & Mia Korpiola, ‘Medieval Canon Law: The Origins of Modern Criminal Law’ in 
Markus D Dubber & Tatjana Hörnle, The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law (OUP 2014). 
8 E.g. Michael J Broyde, ‘The Hidden Influence of Jewish Law on the Common Law: One Lost Example’ 
(2007) 57 Emory Law Journal 1403; Jonathan Fisher, ‘Self-Incrimination at Common Law – Its Origin 
In Jewish Law’ in Nahum Rakover (ed), Jerusalem City of Law and Justice, ed. (The Library of Jewish 
Law) 461-474. 
9 Rémi Brague (Lydia G Cochrane trans.), The Law of God: The Philosophical History of an Idea 
(University of Chicago Press 2007) 86; David Novak, ‘Law and Religion in Judaism’ in John Witte Jr 
and Frank S Alexander (eds), Christianity and Law: An Introduction (CUP 2008) 35. 
10 Berman, The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (n 5) 588. 
11 Stanley Cohen, ‘Guilt, Justice and Tolerance: Some Old Concepts for a New Criminology’ in Stanley 
Cohen, Against Criminology (Transaction Books 1988) 114; Simon Cottee, ‘Judging Offenders: The 
Moral Implications of Criminological Theories’ in Malcolm Cowburn et al (eds), Values in Criminology 
and Criminal Justice (Policy Press 2013) 5.  
12 George P Fletcher, The Grammar of Criminal Law, Volume One: Foundations (OUP 2007) 301.  
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tendency within contemporary legal scholarship to demoralize and secularize,13 even 
where there is a desire to borrow from the theological conceptual toolkit.14 This is 
frequently perceived as a process of emancipation,15 which downgrades the place of 
religious thought, and other ‘contentious metaphysical assumptions’, within modern 
criminal law.16   
 Whatever its causes, this disengagement comes at a cost. Each of the key 
tensions that arise within the criminal law’s blaming practices has a counterpart within 
Judaic-Christian models of soteriology. How to assess the culpability of advertent vis-
à-vis inadvertent misconduct and how to satisfy the drive to both condemn and forgive 
transgressors are pressing questions in both spheres of knowledge, themselves 
underpinned by the challenge of accommodating the agential-yet-determined nature of 
human conduct. As I argue in the following sections, as the genealogical if not strictly 
causal predecessors of contemporary culpability commitments, these soteriological 
models constitute a valuable resource for thinking through and better appreciating the 
nature of these tensions where they arise in law. Importantly, however, they also point 
towards how these tensions might be reconciled within an overarching framework of 
redemption within which guilt plays a central part.  
 Taking as a starting point the work of George Fletcher, who is one of the few 
contemporary theorists to advocate substantive consideration of the criminal law’s 
theological underpinnings, in the following section I outline two meanings of guilt that 
arise within both religious and criminal justice thinking. Although Fletcher’s work is 
distinctive in its engagement with Biblical sources, his analysis and conclusions 
highlight prevailing assumptions within criminal law scholarship, and some of their 
shortcomings. This makes his work particularly suitable as a counterpoint to the 
remaining sections of the article, where I seek to show that, pace Fletcher, the two 
forms of guilt he identify are intimately connected, operating as lynchpins that connect 
transgression and reconciliation in complex ways.   
This analysis suggests, by way of analogy, some ways of moving beyond many 
of the divides that animate liberal criminal law theory and practice, recasting what are 
often considered to be opposing commitments as complementary constituents of an 
integrated whole. As I argue more fully in section 5, the apparent need to choose 
between subjective and objective liability, accepting freewill as absolute or denying its 
relevance, and between pursuing retributivist, rehabilitative or deterrent aims is 
revealed to be spurious and the product of a disintegrated view of culpability and 
punishment. By providing a fuller appreciation of the nature of this disintegration and 
a template for how it might be ameliorated, this analysis therefore offers both a critical 
understanding of several perennial debates in criminal liability and suggestions as to 
how we might approach them differently. 
 
2. The Paradox and Mystery of Guilt 
                                                        
13 E.g. Matt Matravers ‘De-moralising Retributivism: Agency, Blame and Humanity in Criminal Law 
Theory and Practice’ in Jonathan Jacobs & Jonathan Jackson, Routledge Handbook of Criminal Justice 
Ethics (Routledge 2016) 144; Bruce N Waller, The Powerful Belief in Moral Responsibility (MIT Press 
Scholarship 2015).  
14 E.g. R A Duff, Punishment, Communication and Community (OUP 2001); ‘Penance, Punishment and 
the Limits of Community’ (2003) 5 Punishment and Society 295. 
15 Tatjana Hörnle, ‘Guilt and Choice in Criminal Law Theory – A Critical Assessment’ (2016) 4(1) 
Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 1 at 14. 
16 W Cole Durham Jr, ‘Religion and the Criminal Law: Types and Contexts of Interaction’ in J Witte et 
al, The Weightier Matters of Law: Essays on Law and Religion (Scholars Press 1988) 198; Chad Flanders, 
‘Punishment, Liberalism, and Public Reason’ (2017) Criminal Justice Ethics 61. 
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For Fletcher, guilt is the paradox and mystery of criminal law: this charged moral term 
is used to refer to an essential component of liability to punishment, but the defendant’s 
feelings, including her ‘“actual guilt” for having committed the crime’ are irrelevant to 
conviction, and they remain irrelevant until sentencing, when her ‘remorse or regret’ 
but ‘not guilt’ become relevant.17 Furthermore, no criminal justice actor need actually 
blame the defendant; she must be considered blameworthy to be found guilty but those 
condemning her ‘need not tender a feeling of blame’.18 
 As these remarks indicate, Fletcher uses ‘guilt’ to refer to two distinct entities: 
a transgression and a response. This tallies with contemporary psychological literature, 
which distinguishes guilt – delinquency, offence, crime or sin and feeling guilty – an 
affective-cognitive hybrid that stems from the state of guilt.19 According to Fletcher’s 
analysis, these two forms of guilt have been recognised since at least the book of 
Genesis, in which ‘guilt’ appears as an external form of ‘pollution’ that possesses a 
fixed quantity (objective guilt) and as a subjective feeling that admits of degrees 
(positive guilt).20 Fletcher describes these as ‘radically opposed’, dichotomous senses 
of guilt, the former of which, in earlier times, elicited expatiating sacrifices and the 
latter of which is met with punishment. Like others before him, Fletcher believes our 
modern conception of ‘guilt’ is skewed towards the subjective response and we have 
forgotten how to make sense of the older, alternative idea of guilt as a manifest stain on 
the land.21  
 Fletcher juxtaposes these two forms of guilt elsewhere, contrasting a purely 
formal idea of accountability, which, on breach of a norm, is presumed in the absence 
of contradicting reasons (i.e. objective guilt) and a subjective experience, which 
amounts to affirmative content that must be established in every case of punishable 
criminal wrongdoing (i.e. positive guilt). Once again, he casts this distinction as an 
ambiguity in the meaning of guilt,22 which he connects to a further ‘mystery’ identified 
from his Biblical study: that ‘guilt’ refers both to events for which a confession could, 
and should, be given, i.e. instances of conscious wrongdoing, but also to sins committed 
in error or without knowledge, for which the need for a confession might go 
unrecognized. Through his analysis, Fletcher concludes that sin sacrifices would be 
offered for unconscious wrongdoing, when punishment was inappropriate. This 
interpretation sets up a distinction between sacrifice and punishment (though an 
(admittedly) somewhat confused relationship between the two is suggested) that maps 
on to the distinction between objective and subjective guilt.23 
 This precis of Fletcher’s work discloses some of the ways it relates to 
contemporary debates in criminal law, particularly around the significance of inner 
states in attributing liability and dispensing punishment and whether there is a 
                                                        
17 George P Fletcher, ‘Punishment, Guilt, and Shame in Biblical Thought’ (2004) 18(2) Notre Dame 
Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy 343 at 343. 
18 Ibid at 344; Fletcher (n 12) 299. 
19 Jeff Elison, ‘Shame and Guilt: A Hundred Years of Apples and Oranges’ (2005) 23 New Ideas in 
Psychology 5 at 5-7. 
20 A similar point is made within the psychological literature: a person is either guilty or not but the 
affective-cognitive hybrid that attaches to this state of guilt may vary (ibid 12); Fletcher (n 3) 308. 
21  Fletcher (n 17) at 344; Fletcher (n 12) 304-305. Nietzsche of course wrote on the (damaging) 
interiorization of guilt in The Genealogy of Morals and we can see the assumption that ‘guilt’ equates to 
this internal response in contemporary legal literature e.g. Chris Thornhill, ‘Guilt and the Origins of 
Modern Law’ (2014) Economy and Society 103-135 at 104. 
22 Fletcher (n 12) 299-300.  
23 Ibid 122-123.  
 5 
connection between these two matters. Since Fletcher perceives a split between these 
issues, portraying the two forms of guilt as opposing and accountability and punishment 
as wholly separable, 24  he concludes that criminal sanctions can be perceived as 
centering on either on acts, guilt (meaning the positive conception) or actors.25 In his 
view, punishment is imposed for wrongdoing (acts) and not for guilt (meaning the 
positive conception; the objective conception remains relevant insofar as the actor must 
be accountable).26 
 There is much to commend this analysis. It draws out the partiality towards 
advertence-based liability within contemporary legal literature and practice27 and the 
associated tendency to regard mental states as free-floating, things-in-the-world that 
must be interrogated as such, despite our limited capacity to do so.28 But to describe 
these different meanings of guilt as conflicting and to cleave accountability and 
punishment apart so thoroughly is, ironically, to miss the central lesson provided by 
considering the religious legacy of culpability. My own examination of guilt within its 
Judaic-Christian soteriological contexts, explored fully in the following sections, 
instead reveals an integrity to transgression and response (both the response of the 
transgressor and the one to whom she is accountable) that is based on the possibility of 
redemption. 
This longstanding complementarity explains why it is problematic to underplay 
the role of positive guilt, i.e. the feelings arising in connection with a transgressive act 
or omission that might prompt reflection and reform. As I argue more fully in section 
4, even if these feelings do not precede or accompany the wrongdoing, and even if they 
are absent at the point of attributing liability, they should be what punishment – 
understood in its widest sense as communicating censure, upholding the integrity of 
law, and making amends29 – at least aims to elicit. To be sure, unlike the sinner who 
brings herself before God the criminal offender seldom subjects herself to state 
punishment voluntarily.30 As an analogue, however, the prospect of divine salvation 
and the importance in this process of being moved to repentance, via recognizing and 
reacting to one’s objective guilt, suggests that it is unobjectionable to impose criminal 
liability for inadvertent conduct so long as there is some possibility that the offender 
might be brought to see her fault – conceived, as I explain in the following sections, as 
failing to adhere to established normative expectations – and some likelihood that she 
might meet these expectations in future. It also explains why concern with an 
individual’s inner state should be central to imposing criminal liability. This does not 
require treating mental states, when they constitute a component of criminal liability, 
as freestanding. It merely requires that attributing liability and imposing punishment be 
aimed partly at stimulating an internal response (positive guilt) and that transgressive 
acts (objective guilt) reflect the actor’s interiority. By this view, it makes little sense to 
                                                        
24 Cf Gabriele Taylor, Pride, Shame, and Guilt (Clarenden Press 1985) 89. 
25 Fletcher (n 12) 27-37. 
26 Ibid 307. 
27 Ibid 309, 312, 315; Jeremy Horder, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law (8th ed) (OUP 2016) p 196, 
204, 207. For influential work in this vein, see Kimberly Kessler Ferzan and Larry Alexander, Crime 
and Culpability: A Theory of Criminal Law (CUP 2009). 
28 Fletcher (n 12) 55, 283, 307. On the separate and independent proof of actus reus and mens rea, see 
Stephen J Morse, ‘The “Guilty Mind”: Mens Rea’ in Dorothy K Kagehiro & William S Laufer, The 
Handbook of Psychology and Law (Springer 1992). 
29 Though not necessarily always brought together in the same way with the same emphases.  
30 Although voluntary subjection to state punishment might be considered an ideal (e.g. Jacob Adler, 
The Urgings of Conscience (Temple University Press 1992)). 
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segregate act, actor and ‘guilt’-based conceptions of criminal law and there is no room 
for considering acts and inner states as severable. 
 All of this goes to show how Fletcher is to some extent reinventing the wheel 
when he proposes his alternative ‘normative’ theory of guilt, according to which all 
offences – intentional, reckless, and negligent – involve evaluative judgments of 
blameworthiness,31 and his holistic theory of action, which defies mind/body dualism 
and challenges the ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ split in criminal liability. 32  This 
normative theory is not, as he portrays it, a development that transcends both the ancient 
and psychological theories of guilt. Rather, it reprises (and depletes) the ancient view 
of guilt which, as closer examination reveals, did not operate exclusively as an 
‘objective’ conception. An integrated understanding of guilt also reveals the facility of 
Fletcher’s suggestions that we blame failure to perceive risk rather than choice to run 
risk and that we blame in the absence of excusing conditions rather than on the basis 
of conscious factors, such as intentionally violating the law.33 These are not mutually 
exclusive commitments and accommodating them is not a zero-sum game. An 
integrated understanding of guilt also undermines Fletcher’s view that punishment is 
not imposed for ‘guilt’ (positive guilt), or bad character, but solely for wrongdoing.34 
On a more integrated view, punishment may not be for guilt in the sense that it seeks to 
censure guilty feeling but it is for guilt in the sense that it seeks to elicit an affective-
cognitive response. At times Fletcher comes close to recognizing the deeper logic to 
which his theological ruminations might have led. For example, he writes: 
  
 It is almost as though the purpose of punishment in practice is not to sanction 
 guilt but somehow to bring the defendant to the point of feeling guilty. If he or 
 she already has the feeling, there is no point to the exercise. And yet without 
 the potential of the defendant’s feeling guilty, the criminal trial makes no 
 sense.35 
 
Fletcher’s inability to see that we might sanction objective guilt while at the same time 
seeking to stimulate subjective, ‘positive’ guilt could, I suggest, be rectified by a fuller 
acquaintance with the religious origins he so astutely ascribes to modern conceptions 
of criminal culpability. As I seek to show in section 5, acquaintance with these origins 
has implications for other theorists, indeed for anyone concerned with the nature and 
structure of culpability, too. A working, though by no means comprehensive, 
knowledge of the main dimensions of Judaic-Christian soteriology that reflect their 
contemporary criminal law correlates is therefore of widespread benefit. 
 
3. Intention, Consciousness and the Scope of Culpability 
 
Each of the religious traditions considered in this article employs a different conception 
of sin and is characterized by a different underlying anthropology, and these diverse 
views feed in to correspondingly varied conceptions of atonement and salvation. As 
becomes clear through comparison, however, there are certain similarities that 
                                                        
31 Fletcher (n 12) 327. This is similar to Lacey’s claim that there is no evaluatively neutral way of setting 
culpability thresholds (Nicola Lacey, ‘Responsibility Without Consciousness’ (2015) 36(2) OJLS 219). 
32 Fletcher (n 12) 55-66. On the prevalence of this divide, see Alan Norrie, Crime, Reason, History (3rd 
ed) (CUP 2014) chs 1, 2 & 3. 
33 Ibid 320. 
34 Fletcher, ‘Remembrance of Articles Past’ 269 at 271; Fletcher (n 12) 223, 228, 255. 
35 Fletcher (n 12) 300. 
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transcend these distinctions, which centre on the importance of ensuring that a route to 
redemption remains open in the face of our ubiquitous tendency to fall short of the 
expectations placed upon us. As I discuss in the following section, acknowledging that 
people will inevitably breach the norms that apply to them has implications for what 
might be deemed an appropriate response. It also has implications for how these 
breaches are conceived, what role is played by consciousness and intentionality, and 
the ways these two inner states are reflected in transgressive acts.  
 In respect of the Jewish tradition, although it is far from monolithic, 36 the 
prevailing assumption is that humans possess free will37 and the archetypal conception 
of law is that of divine, posited commands.38 In keeping with this, the severest penalty 
under Jewish criminal law – death – requires, at least theoretically, satisfaction of strict 
evidentiary rules demonstrating the offender’s wilful violation of the relevant 
command(s).39 This willfulness is more than a condition of accountability – it is the 
deliberate, brazen violation of God’s law in rebellion against God’s will, as 
demonstrated by the offender, having been forewarned that she is about to violate God’s 
law, affirming that she has understood and will commit the offence regardless.40  
 The realm of crime is wider than this, however.41 Although they are weighted 
and atoned for differently, inadvertent transgressions – described as those committed 
without intention, knowledge or consciousness, including in error42 – are certainly 
regarded as sinful.43 The need for contrition in these cases, discussed in the next section, 
suggests there is a sense of culpability at play.44 Importantly there does not seem to be 
any categorical divide between conscious and unconscious offending within Judaic 
thinking. Pace Fletcher, guilt and sin sacrifices – the two types of sacrifices that were 
offered by way of atonement prior to the destruction of the Temple in 70CE 45 – do not 
appear to have been distinguished on the basis of advertence. The difference between 
these kinds of sacrifice is notoriously complex, but scholarly interpretation suggests 
that the distinction hinged on the infliction of damage: sin sacrifices were for unwitting 
offences but guilt sacrifices were for both deliberate and unwitting offences when they 
caused damage.46 Both conscious and unconscious offences were therefore deemed 
culpable and merited contrition. 
 Despite its different economy of salvation and conception of law, mainstream 
Christian teaching divides up the realm of culpability in a similar way. 47  Unlike 
                                                        
36 For reasons for space no consideration will be given to the differences between, for example, 
Orthodox and Reformed Jews. 
37 Friedrich Avemarie, ‘Sin, Guilt and Forgiveness: Judaism’ Religion Past and Present (Brill 2009). 
38 On the long, complex history of Jewish law, see N S Hecht et al (eds), An Introduction to the History 
and Sources of Jewish Law (Clarenden Press 1996).  
39 There are some difficulties with applying the term ‘crime’ to these offences but the term is often used. 
Stephen M Passamaneck, ‘The Concept of Crime in the Jewish Tradition’ in Walter Jacob and Moshe 
Zemer, Crime and Punishment in Jewish Law (Berghahn Books 1999) 12; Rabbi Richard A Block, 
‘Capital Punishment’ in Jacob and Zemer Crime and Punishment in Jewish Law 67. 
40 Arnold Enker, ‘Jewish Law’ in Dubber and Hörnle (eds) (n 7) 269. 
41 Understood as a violation of God’s law (Passamaneck (n 39) 10). 
42 NH Snaith ‘The Sin-Offering and the Guilt-Offering’ (1965) Vetus Testamentum 73 at 77; Brent A 
Strawn ‘What Is It Like to Be a Psalmist? Unintentional Sin and Moral Agency in the Psalter’ (2015) 
40(1) Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 61 at 67-68. 
43 Avemarie (n 37).  
44 John Stanton-Ife, ‘Strict Liability: Stigma and Regret’ (2007) 27(1) OJLS 151. 
45 Alexander Guttman, ‘The End of the Sacrificial Cult’ (1967) 38 Hebrew Union College Annual 137. 
46 Snaith (n 42) 73. 
47 Brague suggests that the ‘“law” of the Old Testament and the “grace” of the New’ can both be 
understood as conditions of access to salvation the term lex can apply to both so that it is possible to 
speak of a ‘“law of grace”’ (Brague (n 9) 108). 
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Judaism, Western (Latin) Christianity holds that every person born into the world is 
tainted by original sin. Although the focus of this paper is ‘actual sins’ (i.e. discrete 
sinful acts or omissions),48 this difference is important because the effect of original sin 
and the corresponding role of God’s grace in facilitating salvation are important in 
understanding the distinctions in what can loosely be described as the Protestant and 
Catholic traditions.49 The Catholic tradition teaches that baptism provides release from 
original sin and the concupiscentia that remains is merely an inducement to sin.50 
According to this view, human nature is not wholly corrupt, 51 and people remain 
capable of choosing right from wrong. Coupled to the belief that God has made truth 
and goodness available in the form of Scripture, Christ, the Church and natural reason, 
which provides knowledge of the natural law,52 this positive view of human nature is 
key to understanding the Catholic notions that only that which offends the conscience 
is sin and that guilt arises from consenting to commit a transgressive act.53  
 Traces of these two requirements are evident in contemporary criminal law 
theory, most notably in the concern with consciousness and choice,54 but it is important 
to recognize that within their theological context these two stipulations do not suggest 
that inadvertent wrongdoing is marginalized or excluded from the realm of culpability 
or that consent or offence against conscience must be proved separately from the 
transgressive act. With such a positive conception of human nature and confidence in 
the availability of natural law, it makes sense to assume many sinful acts are chosen 
against one’s conscience, in the absence of excuse. In classical Catholic theology, 
ignorance might provide such an excuse but, crucially, this excuse will only be 
available where the ignorance is invincible (non-culpable). In the case of natural law, 
ignorance cannot be considered invincible, so, where it exists, it can lessen but not 
alleviate culpability.55 Outside the realm of natural law, ignorance is invincible only if 
it could not have been removed by applying reasonable diligence. 56 This suggests that 
the connection between culpability and consent resembles the notion of ‘choice’ that 
animates some contemporary criminal law theory, according to which culpability turns 
                                                        
48 To parallel the conception of secular crimes. For the same reason, the article is therefore not concerned 
with sins that are mere thoughts. 
49 Christopher Ocker, ‘Explaining Evil and Grace’ in Ulinka Rublack (ed) The Oxford Handbook of the 
Protestant Reformations (OUP 2016) 23. Anglicanism, though of worldwide import, is not considered 
separately here, partly because of its ‘radically provisional’ nature (Paul Avis, The Identity of 
Anglicanism: Essentials of Anglican Ecclesiology (Bloomsbury 2001) ch 1) and partly because its 
soteriology appears similar to the Protestant view outlined here (William G Witt, ‘Anglican Reflections 
on Justification by Faith’ (2013) 95(1) Anglican Theological Review 57-80). 
50 Wolf Krötke, ‘Sin, Guilt and Forgiveness: Dogmatics’ Religion Past and Present (Brill 2009).  
51 Heinrich Holze, ‘Sin, Guilt and Forgiveness: Church History’ Religion Past and Present (Brill 2009). 
52 David A Hoekama, ‘Punishment, the Criminal Law and Christian Social Ethics’ (1986) Criminal 
Justice Ethics 5:2 40; Jean Porter, Natural & Divine Law: Reclaiming the Tradition for Christian Ethics 
(Novalis 1999). 
53 Holze (n 51). 
54 Durham (n 16) 204; Berman, Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (n 5) 181-198. Contemporary 
criminal law theory does not often require offence of conscience (cf Douglas Husak, Ignorance of Law: 
A Philosophical Inquiry (OUP 2016)). 
55 Stephen P Garvey ‘Two Kinds of Criminal Wrongs’ (2003) 5(3) Punishment & Society 279 at 284. 
56 James Akin, ‘Ignorance – Invincible and Vincible’, (1999) Catholic Answers Inc 39 available at: 
https://www.catholicculture.org/culture/library/view.cfm?recnum=1203; Joseph A Shelling, Reframing 
Catholic Theological Ethics (OUP 2016) 64-65. On the complex distinctions between types of ignorance 
in Catholic moral theology see Romanus Cessario OP, Introduction to Moral Theology (Catholic 
University Press of America 2001) 113-115.  
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on whether the offender had fair opportunity to conform to the law.57 Rather than a bare 
assessment of capacity, this is at heart a normative question that reflects some ideal of 
character or virtue, which the offender has failed to meet.58   
 Within this broad realm of culpability, transgressive acts are ranked by severity 
in accordance with a complex of object and subjective tests that determine whether the 
violation is a mortal or merely venial sin.59 Significantly, a contemptuous motivation 
transforms an otherwise venial sin into a mortal one. In such cases, the offender’s 
disdain, rather than her deliberation and knowledge, is crucial; just as a breach of divine 
law shows disdain for God, a contemptuous breach of human law shows disdain for 
justice and, indirectly, disdain for God. It seems that this contempt is assumed if not 
rebutted, for showing a just cause for breaking the law can negate inferences of 
contempt.60 
 This schema of fault, which encompasses both neglectful and contemptuous 
behaviour, is reflected, with different emphasis, within Protestant thinking. In relation 
of key soteriological matters, including the nature of sin and the appropriation of 
salvation, the Protestant Reformation marked a decisive break from the Catholic beliefs 
that had preceded it. Beginning with Luther, the Reformers introduced a radical 
understanding of sin, according to which humans are innately and inevitably evil and 
corrupt, and their reason, will and emotion are disabled from doing any good that might 
contribute towards salvation. 61  As discussed in the following section, this has 
implications for the power of offenders to attain forgiveness and turn away from sin 
unassisted. It also has ramifications for the sphere of culpability.  
 Protestant theology rejects the idea that the sins of justified Christians are 
confined to ‘consciously committed actual sins’.62 This makes sense according to a 
Protestant view of the person, according to which every human is afflicted with 
existential sinfulness63 and has only unreliable innate knowledge of good and evil.64 If 
sins were restricted to consciously committed wrongs then these beliefs in perverted 
reason and compromised ability to discern right from wrong would mean very few acts 
would constitute sins. In keeping with this attitude towards sin, Protestantism holds all 
sins to be mortal and deserving of damnation, save for the mercy of God. 65 
Nevertheless, the Reformers distinguished sins on the basis of gravity, with resisting 
grace and fighting against mercy being amongst the most heinous.66 They also taught 
that the gravity of sins could vary with the circumstances. Sins proceeding from ‘strong 
affections of the heart’ were less grievous, whereas those emerging from a set purpose, 
those injuring important individuals or occurring in public places, and those repeated 
enough to harden into habit, were aggravated.67  
                                                        
57 E.g. Lacey (n 31), where she describes conscious choice as just one way of meeting the fair opportunity 
condition (at 235). 
58 Garvey (n 55) 287. 
59 Richard R Ross, ‘Binding in Conscience: Early Modern English Protestants and Spanish Thomists on 
Law and the Fate of the Soul’ (2015) 33(4) Law and History Review 803 at 806-808. 
60 Ibid 809- 813. 
61 Ocker (n 49) 29; Holze (n 51). 
62 Risto Saarinen, ‘Repentance: Dogmatics, Protestant’ Religion Past and Present (Brill 2009). 
63 Protestantism teaches that even those who are justified remain sinners. Christians are therefore simul 
isutus et peccator, both just and sinner at once (Krötke (n 50); Ocker, (n 49) 30). 
64  Richard Bourne ‘Communication, Punishment and Virtue: The Theological Limitation of 
(Post)Secular Penance’ (2014) Journal of Religious Ethics 78 at 102. 
65 Ross (n 59) 806; Emma Disley, ‘Degrees of Glory: Protestant Doctrine and the Concept of Rewards 
Hereafter’ (1991) 42(1) The Journal of Theological Studies 77 at 81. 
66 Disley ibid at 83-84. 
67 Ross (n 59) at 815. 
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 Drawing these summaries together, it is clear that within each tradition 
examined there is an arena of culpability whose parameters are determined normatively 
with reference to the capacities humans are considered to possess. Within Judaic and 
Catholic theologies, which largely assume a robust moral agency, there is an emphasis 
on consciousness and choice but these are not necessarily conceived as separable from 
the sinful conduct and neither implies that inadvertence precludes culpability. In 
contrast, Protestantism emphasizes the compromised ability of humans to perceive, and 
act on, what is right and thus consciousness is not a requirement of sin. Though 
transgressive acts express the inner nature of the sinner,68 this connection does not 
hinge on choice and consent. Across all three models there is a subset of particularly 
heinous offences that is connected up with purposive action and rebellion.  
 This dual focus on scorn and dereliction captures the generally received essence 
of sin well. Although it can be expressed in hubristic pride or indolent self-neglect, it 
is always both: ‘rebellion and resignation, protest and sloth’, ‘[i]t oscillates between 
these two poles.’69 The fact that both are of equal concern, though not equal severity, 
reflects the nature of law as both command and counsel that arises across and within 
Judaism and Christianity. Although typically described as a religion of command, the 
Judaic tradition also conceives of law as a normative model that offers guidance on how 
to live righteously.70 Conversely, Christianity, within which law generally refers to the 
possibility of salvation through Christ’s sacrifice rather than a set of commandments, 
has nevertheless at times been described as excessively legalistic.71 This heritage of law 
as both command and counsel helps explain why within the religious traditions 
discussed sin encompasses both the failure to observe rules and the failure to meet 
normative, even aspirational, standards. That law should fulfill both these roles 
articulates and supports the view of humanity as essentially conflicted – as incapable 
of avoiding sin but not beyond recovery – that underlies the Judaic-Christian tradition.72 
To appreciate how these factors work together to elucidate the justness of treating both 
types of shortcoming as blameworthy it is essential to turn to the purposes of 
punishment across the different traditions.  
 
4. Punishment, Engaging Conscience and the Path to Reconciliation 
 
As with the contours of culpability, the form and aims of punishment – what an offender 
is expected to do in the wake of sinning and to what ends – are bound up with the 
anthropology and conception of salvation that underpins each tradition. Unimpeded by 
original sin, transgressors within the Judaic tradition are considered capable of atoning 
for their offences via unmediated sacrifices and punishments. In contrast, within the 
Christian tradition atonement depends on the faithful participation in Christ’s sacrifice 
and the more enduring the effects of original sin the less able sinners are able to co-
operate in their own salvation. Hence, within Protestantism the most atonement a sinner 
                                                        
68 Debora Shuger, ‘The Reformation of Penance’ (2008) 71(4) Huntingdon Library Quarterly 557 at 564. 
69 Krötke (n 50). 
70 As reflected in the term Halahka, which refers to the whole corpus of Jewish law as well as specific 
laws and is thought to be founded on metaphoric use of ‘a path to walk on’ (Peretz Segal, ‘Jewish Law 
During the Tannaitic Period’ in N S Hecht et al (eds), An Introduction to the History and Sources of 
Jewish Law 102) and the wider interpretation of ‘torah’ as ‘teaching’ rather than merely ‘law’ (Brague 
(n 9) 250-252). 
71 As discussed in Brague (n 9) 211, 242. 
72 John Cottingham, ‘Conscience, Guilt and Shame’ in Roger Crisp (ed), The Oxford Handbook of the 
History of Ethics (2013) 732. 
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can offer is a repentant attitude. 73  Irrespective of these differences, the expiatory 
conduct must always be accompanied by remorse and the resolution to abstain from 
future sin if reconciliation is to be achieved. This internal dimension is consequently of 
crucial importance and its stimulation constitutes one of the aims of punishment, 
understood as the imposition of hard treatment, across the Judaic-Christian tradition. 
Indeed, unless this internal shift is thought possible imposing blame makes little sense, 
especially in the case of unconscious offending.74 Atonement for culpable wrongs 
(objective guilt), even when it is conceived as deserved suffering, is therefore intimately 
connected with future-oriented concerns and these two are bound together by the 
emergence, or invocation, of a particular affective response (subjective guilt). 
 The connection between these two forms of guilt is evident within the Judaic 
tradition through its early system of cultic sacrifices. 75  These sacrifices were not 
mechanistic vehicles of atonement, made with no regard for the affective response 
(positive guilt) of the transgressor. To be sure, an unconscious sinner, unaware of her 
sin, could not confess as could a conscious sinner,76 but she could be moved to repent 
by sickness or suffering, afflictions that were considered to be divine punishment.77 
Either path – confession of sin or acknowledgement of unconscious transgressions 
following divine punishment – could move the sinner to repentance. With this in mind, 
it seems mistaken to portray these sacrifices as capable of substantiating a direct link 
between objective guilt and punishment that bypasses subjective (positive) guilt 
positive.78 Punishment, in the form of suffering inflicted by God, served to sensitize 
unconscious offenders to their sinful state, following which they might be motivated to 
seek forgiveness, by way of an expatiating sacrifice, and to request assistance in gaining 
a wise heart. 79  It seems in these instances that punishment was connected up to 
objective guilt, therefore, but in a way that incorporated what we might now describe 
as an affective-cognitive response. 
 This suggestion is supported by interpretations of these sacrifices that consider 
them to have been insufficient, in isolation, to elicit forgiveness. According to this view, 
without remorse and the resolution to abide by God’s commandments, forgiveness and 
salvation would not be forthcoming. Within Rabbinic writings on crime and 
punishment, even kārēt – the excision that has been interpreted variously to mean 
premature death, death of the soul or permanent excommunication from the community 
– is considered avoidable through malqut (whipping) and repentance.80 Furthermore, 
when the twelfth century (CE) philosopher Maimonides set out the requirements of 
teshuva,81 they included remorse, the resolution not to repeat wrongdoing, confession 
                                                        
73 Saarinen (n 62).  
74 Within Biblical law, murder constitutes an exception to this. Even unintentional killing must be 
punished with death because this breach of natural law is an ‘essential reality distinct from the legal 
responsibility of the perpetrator’. As this explanation makes clear, here punishment is imposed for 
reasons other than blame (Devora Steinmetz, Punishment and Freedom: The Rabbinic Construction of 
Criminal Law (University of Pennsylvania Press 2008) ch 4). 
75 Although these offerings were sometimes imposed as punishments, they were stipulated but seldom 
legally enforced (Walter Jacob, ‘Punishment: Its Method and Purpose’ in Jacob and Zemer (eds) (n 39) 
57). 
76 Strawn (n 42) 69. 
77 Ernst-Joachim Waschke, ‘Repentance: Old Testament’ Religion Past and Present (Brill 2009); Jacob 
(n 75) 47. 
78 Cf Fletcher (n 17) at 347. 
79 Strawn (n 42) at 70-72. 
80 Steinmetz (n 74) ch 5, especially 73, 97. 
81 Which translates to ‘return’ and is usually taken to mean ‘repentance’. 
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and the changing of one’s ways. According to one contemporary interpreter, the order 
in which remorse and resolution occur is interchangeable but both are essential.82 
 This resolution to change makes sense according to the robust view of moral 
agency that is generally found within Judaism across the ages. The inadvertent sinner 
may have committed a lesser offence than her advertent counterpart but she could have 
done better. 83  This model of agency is most clearly expressed in the book of 
Deuteronomy, where humans are portrayed as capable of distinguishing obedience 
from disobedience and choosing and acting accordingly.84 Elsewhere in the Hebrew 
Bible, however, weaker conceptions of human agency appear. At their most drastic, 
these call into question the capacity of sinners to repent or become reformed in the 
absence of divine assistance, with some portions of the book of Ezekial characterizing 
moral agency as a wholly external, divinely acquired gift.85 A similarly negative view 
of moral agency is found in some Qumran texts, dating from the period of Second 
Temple Judaism. In these, various internal and external impairments to moral agency 
are described as surmountable through knowledge of the salvic commands of God and, 
in the case of external impairments, their removal by God.86 In the Hudayot,87 which 
describes all people as possessing a moral faculty so defective as to give rise only to 
guilty actions, the speaker is described as being instilled with the Divine Spirit. This 
spirit does not replace the speaker’s own defective one; it remains tangible and the 
speaker can perceive it working through him, comprising his capacity for moral 
agency.88 
 These two models of full and compromised moral agency are also reflected in 
Catholic and Protestant views of atonement and repentance. In accordance with 
Catholic beliefs in free will, sinners are considered capable, through the sacrament of 
penance, of restoring their relationship with God and thereby obtaining forgiveness and 
salvation. Again, as in the Judaic context, it appears that punishment plays a role in 
prompting an affective response in the case of unconsciously committed sins. During 
the increasing juridification of the Catholic Church across the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries, it became possible for an individual to commit a sin without realizing it. 
Confession was thereby transformed from an act by which a sinner, troubled by a guilty 
conscience, came to seek a means of making reparation into a form of ‘ethical 
instruction and spiritual stocktaking’.89 In respect of this wider sphere of offending, 
confession seems to be a way of bringing the offender to remorse. In other words, rather 
than being spontaneously triggered at the time of transgression, in these cases the 
engagement of conscience occurs later, at the time of dispensing the demands for 
reparation.  
                                                        
82 Samuel J Levine ‘Teshuva: A look at Repentance, Forgiveness and Atonement in Jewish Law and 
Philosophy and American Legal Thought’ (1999) 27 (5) Fordham Urban Law Journal 1677 at 1682-
1685. According to Levine, teshuva is present in the Bible, Talmud, and the legal and philosophical 
writings of medieval and modern scholars (at 1680). 
83 Enker (n 40) 282. 
84 Carol A Newsom, ‘Models of the Moral Self: Hebrew Bible and Second Temple Judaism’ (2012) 
131(1) Journal of Biblical Literature 5 at 15; Anne W Stewart, ‘Moral Agency in the Hebrew Bible’ in 
Oxford Research Encylopedia of Religion DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780199340378.013.9 at 7. 
85 Newsom ibid 8-10, 14. 
86 Ibid 15-21. 
87 Thanksgiving hymn. 
88 Newsom (n 84) 24. 
89 Martin Ohst, ‘Repentance: Church History’ Religion Past and Present (Brill 2009). 
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In keeping with the need for internal change, this reparation must be 
accompanied by contrition on the part of the penitent in order to secure forgiveness.90 
The balance between the role of these contributions and God’s grace in securing this 
justification 91  shifted in response to criticisms by Protestant Reformers that the 
Catholic penitential system, and its focus on good works, implied that God’s freedom 
to save was limited.92 It is now largely accepted that while contrition and satisfaction 
are not the basis for justification, they assist in preparing the offender for justification 
and help her to overcome offending habits. 93 Rejection of one’s sinful self and the 
ongoing formation of virtue are thus both important parts of the Catholic understanding 
of penance.94  
 Unsurprisingly, the negative conception of human nature that pervades 
Protestant theology lends the conscience-raising function of the law a prominent place. 
This so-called theological use of the law serves to reveal to sinners their shortcomings. 
Coupled to the civil use of the law, which aims to deter offenders – ‘a bridle to stay the 
wicked from their mischiefs’ – this theological use operates as a ‘spur to prick forward 
such as be slow and negligent’.95 Unable to fully perceive their depravity unaided, 
humans are dependent on the law, which acts like as a mirror in which one’s 
transgressions and ignorance become apparent. In bringing these sins to light, the law 
serves both to condemn the sinner, ensuring the integrity of the law, and to prompt her 
to seek God’s grace.96 These two effects are intimately connected, for it is only when 
confronted with, and condemned for, her sins that the sinner is moved via a crisis of 
conscience to repent and seek God’s help. As Luther so powerfully put it, ‘when the 
law is being used correctly, it does nothing but reveal sin, work wrath, accuse, terrify, 
and reduce consciences to the point of despair’.97 To be effective, this despair should 
not become so deep as to extinguish hope of forgiveness and belief in the possibility of 
change, though. As with the shame, or guilt, that facilitates teshuva, its purpose is to 
trigger repentance and this aim will be compromised if the offender becomes too 
despondent.98  
 Reflecting the inherently communal nature of Protestantism, others might 
initiate this process of invoking the conscience, too.99 Although Protestant teaching 
rejects the sacrament of penance, repentance is considered essential and any Christian 
can help another to gain knowledge of her heart’s innermost anguish, thereby moving 
her to repent. Hamlet’s treatment of his widowed mother, Gertrude, following her 
marriage to her brother in law provides a powerful literary illustration of this process. 
Faced with this incest, Hamlet berates his mother for her conduct, proclaiming ‘…let 
me wring your heart; for so I shall, / If it be made of penetrable stuff’.100 It is essential 
to recognize that this hard treatment was done in the spirit of love. Despite its apparent 
                                                        
90 Ibid. 
91 God’s act of removing the guilt and penalty of sin and declaring the sinner righteous. 
92 Colin Gunton, ‘Redemption / Soteriology: Dogmatics’ Religion Past and Present (Brill 2009). 
93 Jürgen Werbick, ‘Repentance: Dogmatics, Catholic’ Religion Past and Present (Brill 2009). 
94 Gunton (n 92); Bourne (n 64) at 98-101. 
95 According to an early liturgical handbook from Waldgrave, quoted in John E Witte Jr & Thomas C 
Arthur, ‘The Three Uses of the Law: A Protestant Source of the Purposes of Criminal Punishment’ (1993) 
10(2) Journal of Law and Religion 433 at 443. 
96 Witte & Arthur ibid at 265. 
97 Luther, Werke, Kritische Gesamtausgabe, quoted in Witte & Arthur (n 95) at 437-438. 
98 Levine (n 82) at 1681. 
99 On the communal nature of Protestantism, see Witte Jr, ‘Introduction’ in Witte Jr and Alexander (n 9) 
25. 
100 Roland Mushat Frye, ‘Prince Hamlet and The Protestant Confessional’ (1982) 39(1) Theology Today 
27 at 33. 
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cruelty, it was an act of utmost kindness, aimed at communicating to Gertrude her 
unseen fault so that she might acknowledge and correct it. 101  Repentance – the 
recognition of guilt, the turning away from evil, and the future avoidance of sin – were 
the vital goals pursued by Hamlet’s chastisement. Hence, when a wretched Gertrude 
tells Hamlet he has ‘cleft [her] heart in twain’ he responds, in earnest, ‘O, throw away 
the worser part of it, / And live the purer with the other half’.102 
 These comparisons show that when punishment is understood as comprising 
atonement, censure and repentance as parts of an overarching whole that is aimed at 
contrition and reform, it is well-suited to addressing the dual nature of culpability 
outlined above. Where a sin has been consciously committed, a sinner might be moved 
to repent before any punishment, in the sense of expiation (sacrifices in the Judaic 
context or penitential works in the Catholic context) is undertaken. Where a sin is 
committed unconsciously, however, punishment, in the sense of condemnation, 
precedes the expiation. As demonstrated by the Judaic belief in divinely inflicted 
suffering and the Protestant practices of inducing despair, the purpose of this hard 
treatment is to bring the sufferer to an ex post facto recognition of her culpable 
wrongdoing, thereby inducing remorse and moving her to repent and seek forgiveness. 
The wellbeing of the offender is therefore always at the centre of the process and the 
possibility of turning away from sin, either independently or with divine assistance, is 
key to making sense of blame and punishment. In each case the aim is the same: to 
move from a culpable transgression – objective guilt – to an affective response – 
positive guilt – in order to commence a process of change within the offender. This is 
not to lose sight of the fact that it is the objective guilt that triggers the process to begin 
with and that part of the rationale for punishing is to uphold the integrity of the law and 
to offer expiation for the wrong done. It is merely to bring out the fact that what 
punishment is for – what it is that merits censure – and what it is for – what it is 
supposed to bring about – are inseparable considerations. 
 
5. Questioning Culpability: Implications for Criminal Law Theory 
 
With the benefit of these comparative insights, it is now possible to consider what 
lessons these theological observations on guilt and sin might hold for contemporary 
criminal law theorists. By offering a more holistic view of culpability they help make 
sense of our desire, and tendency, to hold people criminally accountable and punishable 
for negligent (inadvertently reckless) conduct. They suggest some limits on these 
practices though. On a positive conception of human agency, such as that found in 
mainstream Judaism and in Catholicism, blame and punishment is appropriate only 
when an offender could have conformed to the required standard but did not. On a 
negative conception of human agency, blame is appropriate only when the offender 
might plausibly come to conform to the required standard and her punishment is geared 
towards helping her see and move past her fault. This latter point has particularly clear 
implications for our longstanding tendency to apportion blame for negligence 
according to an objective standard. It also highlights the necessary, and two-way, 
connection between culpability and punishment.  
That a lack of consciousness, or some other ‘mental state’, does not necessarily 
preclude a determination of fault does not imply, however, that states of consciousness, 
particularly intention, do not constitute part of what the punishment is for – what merits 
                                                        
101 Ibid at 34-35. 
102 Ibid at 36. 
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censure – when they are present. The longstanding theological practice of treating 
purposive, rebellious acts as particularly reprehensible suggests that the significance of 
intention goes beyond determining accountability. It confirms the more general insight 
that intention is not, as is sometimes suggested, synonymous with voluntariness or 
consciousness103 and suggests that it is not synonymous with ‘fault’ either.104 What this 
history draws out is the role of intention in augmenting culpability on the basis of 
disdain, rather than heightened awareness of the law or the consequences of one’s 
actions. In the case of the religious traditions examined, the disdain is directed towards 
God and God’s laws but it could equally be conceived as disdain toward the secular 
law, one’s legal duties, or the legal rights of others. 105  Interpreted this way, the 
significance of intention lies in its association with an offender’s purpose and the 
reasons for her conduct. In this respect, it has some affinity with the argument that in 
‘harmful direct agency’ the relevant intention is the intention to involve a non-
consenting other in a plan to further one’s own purposes, rather than the intention to 
harm that other.106 
 Aligning intention with purpose and reasons is not the same as suggesting that 
it, or consciousness, is necessarily the same as either a guilty conscience or remorse.107 
When culpability is tied to inner states this is sometimes taken to imply that the law 
requires proof that the offender experienced a guilty conscience or remorse either at the 
time she committed the act or at the time responsibility is attributed to her. Indeed, 
some have linked this requirement with the ‘Judeo-Christian moral code’.108 As should 
now be clear, the Judeo-Christian soteriological tradition does not, in itself, demand 
either requirement.109 Where sin is defined as that which offends against conscience, 
culpability could be said to rest on the offender’s guilty conscience but this might be 
presumed from the commission of sinful conduct110 and is considered distinct from 
remorse, which arises later, if at all. In other instances of sin that are committed 
unconsciously, a guilty conscience follows the sinful conduct and then prompts 
remorse. In other words, the guilty conscience is produced by attributing accountability 
and inflicting punishment; it is not a requirement for either of these activities. 
 This confusion over the place and meaning of subjective guilt within the Judaic-
Christian tradition and within criminal law thinking more generally perhaps helps 
explain some of the recent calls for its rejection. Replicating many of Fletcher’s 
concerns, Tatjana Hörnle has recently argued that it would be possible, and indeed 
desirable, to dispense with the requirement of ‘guilt’ while retaining other elements of 
                                                        
103 See L A Zaibert, ‘Intentionality, Voluntariness, and Culpability: A Historical-Philosophical Analysis’ 
(1998) 1 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 459.  
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our blaming practices. The main target of her argument is choice theory, or the principle 
of alternative possibilities (PAP) – the idea that moral and legal blame is only legitimate 
if the person blamed could have decided differently – which she denigrates on the basis 
that it does not cohere with neurological evidence that suggests that some elements of 
human decision making (which some scientists consider to be determinative) are 
beyond conscious reflection.111 Her criticism extends to other ways of linking blame to 
inner states too, including older and contemporary character theories, which she 
proclaims to be substitutes for God’s ‘whole person’ assessment of individuals.112 
Rejecting the need for any such surrogate, Hörnle contends that it is legitimate to blame 
an offender simply because she has done wrong in disregarding her social duties and 
another’s rights. For Hörnle, wrongdoing and blame are, unlike ‘guilt’, ‘not just 
historical developments that could or should be reversed’; they should, and can, be 
preserved while treating ‘people’s moral and emotional inner lives like a black box’.113 
This would not, she believes, mean treating all crimes as equally blameworthy or 
determining blame on the basis of harm alone. On her recommendations, attacks would 
still be distinguished from endangerment, with the former considered more heinous, 
but the distinction would turn on whether a third party would describe the conduct as 
directly targeting another person in a hostile way.114 
 These are intriguing proposals and it is easy to sympathize with Hörnle’s 
motivations. As noted in section 2, there remains a subjectivist bias within much 
criminal law scholarship and there are problems with purporting to prove mental states 
as if they were distinct entities. Yet the richer account of guilt developed in this paper, 
which points to the unseverable association that exists between objective and positive 
guilt, suggests some flaws in her suggestions. These centre on the fact that without any 
concern for an offender’s inner state, blame and punishment begin to look inconsistent 
and potentially harsh. To see the inconsistency, consider the claims that criminal 
wrongdoing comprises disregarding victims as co-citizens and that directly targeting 
another person in a hostile way is the most heinous species of criminal wrongdoing. 
The notion of disregard seems to require consciousness, i.e. the conscious rejection of 
the rights of others, and would therefore seem to preclude liability for negligent (or 
inadvertently reckless) conduct. 115  Yet Hörnle would endorse neither of these 
implications. She clearly rejects the idea of basing blame on conscious choice and she 
accepts that negligence can be sufficient to classify an act as a crime.116 Ironically, there 
are of course religious models that can accommodate what Hörnle proposes. As comes 
out most clearly within negative anthropology Judaism and Protestantism, a lack of 
consciousness does not preclude blame for sin, but key to this blaming arrangement is 
affective recognition of one’s wrongdoing and the possibility of future change – the 
possibility that, with divine assistance, a sinner might come to see her fault and adhere 
to the law. In other words, it requires a concern with inner states. 
 It is this concern with change and inner states that makes these soteriological 
models akin to communicative, rather than expressivist, theories of punishment and it 
is this that tempers their potential severity. Unlike expressivist theories of punishment, 
which are ‘one-way streets’ for condemning the breach of collective moral 
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commitments, communicative theories aim to engage the offender in a dialogue and 
thus are concerned with the offender’s response.117 In the case of the soteriological 
models studied, this communication takes the form of an invitation to undertake 
repentance – to experience remorse and moral change. As such, these models depend 
on belief in the possibility of inner change and must be invested in actualizing this. As 
Bourne’s critique of Antony Duff’s secular penance demonstrates, the absence of either 
of these components will render a communicative theory of punishment deficient. In 
Duff’s case, his theory is hampered by discomfort over inculcating virtue and shaping 
character118 and his relative indifference as to whether the offender expresses genuine 
remorse.119 In a similar way, Hörnle’s lack of concern for inner states and her doubts 
about free will and whether character can be shaped120 tend to undermine her theory of 
blame, which she claims is based on communication. 121  Perhaps Hörnle would 
maintain that she is concerned only with behavioural change, rather than change of any 
deeper sort, but it is not clear that it is possible to draw distinctions in this way. The 
resolve that is required for any kind of change is located within, so even if wholesale 
character change is not in contemplation there must be some concern with interiority.122 
On top of this, since culpability is at least partly based on the failure to meet normative 
standards, rather than to obey particular rules, coming to avoid blame often involves an 
attitudinal shift. 
This lack, or partial, concern for inner states is what renders Duff and Hörnle’s 
accounts of punishment problematic and potentially harsh. Both seem to employ a strict 
sense of justice that demands retribution123 but insufficiently concerned with forward-
looking consequences. It is perhaps no coincidence that this variety of justice was 
famously borne of an attempt, by Kant, to replicate many theological assumptions about 
justice while rejecting the Christian framework that supported them.124 In a similar 
way, though framed as an emancipation from religious thinking, Hörnle’s 
recommendations remain tied to a set of theological concepts whose deep logic dictates 
the limits of what is acceptable. These parameters are not easily escaped nor, I would 
argue, should we try to escape them; instead, we should try harder to understand and 
integrate them into contemporary discourse. This promises to alter the discursive 
landscape considerably. At present, the bare, Kantian paradigm of justice dominates 
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have this impediment (ibid at 19). For an expressivist account of blame that might support punishing 
such individuals see Marion Godman and Anneli Jefferson, ‘On Blaming and Punishing Psychopaths’ 
(2017) 11 Criminal Law and Philosophy 127. Note that the possibility of behavioural change is central 
to blaming psychopaths and that the expressions of blame are not directed at the wrongdoer but at the 
wider community (at 138-139). 
123 That Hörnle is dealing in desert is clear from her comment that ‘The judgement: “X has committed a 
wrong and deserves blame for it” retains its sense even if the additional “and he could have decided 
otherwise” is omitted’ (Hörnle (n 15) at 13). 
124 On Kant’s ethical framework, which sees consequentialist criteria for punishment as irreconcilable 
with the demands of strict justice, see Alex Tuckness and John M Parrish, The Decline of Mercy in Public 
Life (CUP 2014) chapter 8, 227. 
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discussions, which is why retributive theories are accused of ‘“stuffing”’ their accounts 
with ‘intrinsic goals that are quasi-utilitarian’125 and why the affective blame associated 
with retributive punishment has attracted criticism.126 But these reprovals do not apply 
to the conception of divine justice that is based on a unity between love and punishment 
– between wrath and reconciliation127  – that is typically missing from contemporary 
accounts that contrast ‘doing justice’ with other, future-regarding aims. 128  
This alternative conception of justice manages to retain desert, blame or 
censure129 without losing the more positive goals of reform and rehabilitation, and it is 
not exclusively associated with individual subjective fault. Whereas contemporary 
iterations of retributive justice, even those that ‘stuff’ their accounts with 
consequentialist side-constraints, have been deployed in the service of a narrow, 
backwards-facing conception of criminal responsibility, this alternative conception is 
perfectly capable of accommodating the more relational, prospective account of 
responsibility that recognizes crimes as setting objective standards for conduct.130 Keen 
observers have pointed to the limitations of the subjective approach to responsibility 
but the explanation provided tends to replicate the same disintegrated view of just 
punishment that leads to the sidelining of objective liability in the first place. When the 
subjective approach is criticized for having ‘focused on the fairness of attribution and 
punishment, rather than responsibility more generally’, 131 this presupposes a contrast 
that arguably only exists when the fairness is presupposed to accord with the hollowed-
out version of justice that has come to prevail. As I have tried to show in the preceding 
sections, when the aims of punishment are understood more broadly not only can we 
see what it might take to render our punishing practices more humane, we can also 
account for, and more deeply understand, our ethical and practical need to censure 
negligent conduct. In other words, we are able to escape the constraints of subjective 
responsibility without losing sight of the importance of trying to render punishment 
just.  
In both cases, the solution lies in recognizing the inherent relationality that 
characterizes every stage of our censuring practices and accepting the responsibility 
this generates at both ends of the blaming relation. When we consider the manifold 
ways we fail in our obligations to one another – however widely this set of obligations 
extends – it becomes clear that these manifest both disdain and indifference. But since 
many of us exhibit this kind of behaviour (albeit not always with criminal 
consequences) and since we are all implicated in the structural inequalities that can 
promote it, there is a real need to take account of these fallibilities when thinking about 
how punishment is performed and justified. One way to do this is to take seriously the 
                                                        
125 Flanders (n 16) 337. 
126 Nicola Lacey and Hannah Pickard, ‘From the Consulting Room to the Court Room? Taking the 
Clinical Model of Responsibility Without Blame into the Legal Realm’ (2012) 33(1) OJLS 1. 
127 See Tuckness and Parrish (n 124).  
128 There are some exceptions, such as Jonathan Jacobs’, ‘Resentment, Punitiveness, and Forgiveness: 
An Exploration of the Moral Psychology of Punishment’ in Jonathan Jacobs & Jonathan Jackson, 
Routledge Handbook of Criminal Justice Ethics (Routledge 2016), which points out the educative 
function of resentment that is linked to motivating reform. 
129 For a sense of what it might require to move away from these commitments, see Christopher Slobogin, 
‘Plea Bargaining and the Substantive and Procedural Goals of Criminal Justice: From Retribution and 
Adversarialism to Preventive Justice and Hybrid-Inquisitorialism’ (2016) William & Mary Law Review 
57 1505.  
130 On the association between relational societies and objective liability see Rita Anne McNamara et 
al, ‘Weighing Outcome vs Intent Across Societies: How Cultural Models of Mind Shape Moral 
Reasoning’ https://psyarxiv.com/kesbu/  
131 Farmer (n 104) 195. 
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idea that punishment is a form of communication and is therefore more than an 
expression of censure. 132  Accepting this means there is no room to claim that 
punishment is unconcerned with bringing about the internal responses that ought to 
accompany a finding of objective guilt and recognition that one has done wrong, which 
might in turn open up the possibility of reconciliation.133 Although the state cannot 
demand genuine remorse or reform and must only punish so far as is deserved, the 
formal satisfaction of whatever obligations and restrictions it imposes is not enough to 
satisfy the communicative justification of this punishment. If an offender merely 
engages in the mechanistic performance of these injunctions there may be nothing more 
the state can demand of her but, pace Duff, this does not mean that she can be 
considered reconciled.134 For this reason, the forms of punishment issued by the state 
ought to be designed so as to enhance the likelihood that deep reform should occur. At 
the very least, they ought not to minimize or eradicate the possibility of reform and 
rehabilitation.135  
This is likely to necessitate the active involvement of others. As the example of 
the Protestant confessional makes clear, anyone can help another see her fault and try 
to move past it: ‘each person…needs the law and the association with others to drive 
her to repentance – every person is inherently communal and belongs to a community’. 
136 We all require assistance (even if it is not divine) in reorienting our attitudes and 
conduct so as to have greater regard for others, and even if punishment plays only an 
indirect role in encouraging these processes it is a role worth promoting. 137 
Appropriately, in light more general integrative ambitions of this article, this attitudinal 
reorientation occurs by way of a process of integration. Research shows that full 
rehabilitation is akin to religious conversion – the intellectual, moral and, ultimately, 
spiritual change through which the self moves from being divided to unified. As the 
ego is decentred and diminished, the heart is enlarged and compassion grows.138 This 
conversion involves learning to ‘unthink’ or ‘unknow’ the automatic responses that 
characterized one’s prior existence, and entails a broadening of perspective to become 
‘cognizant…of the symbolic universe that shelters and legitimates one’s ideas 
regarding the world’.139 
 
6. Conclusion 
                                                        
132 For a thoughtful critique of communicative theories of punishment that are premised on a 
monovalent assumption of mutual respect and formal equality, see Henrique Carvalho, The Preventive 
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When we extrapolate these lessons outward from the penitent offender and apply them 
to the way we think as criminal law theorists, the advantages of attending to the 
theological roots of our criminal justice practices become even clearer. A wider range 
of disciplinary perspectives can illuminate and force us to question the assumptions we 
bring to thinking about criminal culpability and reveal how the practice of considering 
discrete aspects of the blaming enterprise in isolation is unduly restrictive and, frankly, 
distorting. As criminal law theorists, we need to be open to hearing the lessons offered 
by cognate spheres of knowledge, even if they speak to us in a seemingly outmoded 
tongue. 
 To be clear, this does not entail attempting to transpose theological beliefs into 
legal principles, weakening the separation of church and state of even embracing any 
particular religious norms. The ethical insights can be applied independently of any 
faith in God, though they will require substantially more investment in the possibility 
of community than mainstream liberal criminal law theory allows 140  and greater 
emphasis on obligations than rights-oriented contemporary legal systems typically 
embody.141 Nevertheless, there are undeniable limits to how far these lessons might be 
incorporated to any system of law, particularly secular state law, and costs in attempting 
to do so. As Diamantides and others have argued, the ethical responsibility we have for 
others’ suffering is absolute, and all suffering is beyond meaning and redemption. To 
try make this suffering meaningful and to try to tame it – tendencies ascribed to law 
and politics under the Western paradigm of Christianised economic-political theology 
– is to fall prey to a logic of perpetual management that unsuccessfully attempts to 
synthesize infinite compassion and finite law.142  
This is a powerful critique but should not obscure the extent to which this failure 
occurs in varying degrees. Our absolute ethical responsibility to one another is by its 
nature irreducible but not all attempts to capture it within law are equal. Given this, and 
the reality that ours is a society in which law reflects, reinforces, and even creates our 
obligations towards one another, it is important to attend to the ways in which our 
thinking about and using law does this. In the context of criminal law, this means taking 
seriously the appeal of our intuitive desire to censure offenders, to reflect on what it 
means for such offenders to be guilty, and to think critically about what is entailed in 
trying to make sense of these issues.143 This requires interrogating the parallel blaming 
practices from outside the legal realm that have both shaped our law and the way we 
conceive of the concepts and processes on which these practices rest. It also requires a 
rejection of the assertion that justifications for criminal law and punishment should be 
‘beyond metaphysics’.144 Even if we endorse the (contestable) claim that deterrence 
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and social control are the only aims that are capable of overlapping consensus within 
modern society, these aims unavoidably involve ‘shaping and forming people’ in 
accordance with norms we consider valuable. This in turn means that questions of free 
will, motivation, and what we owe one another remain central. These are properly 
subjects of public discourse and not merely of personal conviction.145 It is in the spirit 
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